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In four experiments, we examined the impact of the nature and consistency of people's 
social value orientations on the emergence of cooperative behavior in conditions of 
neutral, morality or might priming.  In line with Van Lange (2000), we expected social 
value orientations to have a greater impact in ambiguous (neutral priming) than in 
unambiguous (morality and might priming) situations. We also expected the later 
moderation to be higher among participants low in consistency (see also Hertel and 
Fiedler, 1998). Overall, participants' behavior shifted in prime-consistent ways. 
However, cooperation was reduced among high consistent pro-selfs primed with 
morality concepts. Experiments 2-4 replicate and generalize these findings, and reveal 
that high consistent pro-selfs exploited partners believed to be cooperative as a result of 
morality priming.  Implications of these results are discussed in the wider context of 
interdependence theory, and in the context of automatic behavior effects. 
2 Do Not Prime Hawks With Doves: The Impact of Dispositions and 
Situation-Specific Features on the Emergence of Cooperative Behavior in 
Mixed-Motive Situations 
In interdependence dilemmas, individuals are faced with a conflicting choice 
between the collective interest and self-interest.  Their outcomes do not only depend on 
their own choices but also on the choices of others.  An individual is often tempted to 
make a non-cooperative, self-interested choice, because it yields higher outcomes to the 
individual than a cooperative, collectively interested choice, irrespective of what others 
may do.  However, if all interested parties choose to follow their self-interest, they are 
all worse off than if they had acted in a cooperative manner (Dawes, 1980).  Therefore, 
mutual cooperative behavior is better for all parties than mutual defection. 
It is largely assumed that individuals do not necessarily follow their immediate 
self-interest in mixed-motive interdependence situations.  Individuals may also behave 
according broader preferences of outcomes for self and others (Kelley & Thibaut, 
1978).  Behaving more or less cooperatively depends on whether individuals relinquish 
self-interested preferences to pursue broader preferences like enhancing the outcomes of 
a collective or enhancing equality in outcomes (Van Lange, 1999).  Interpersonal 
dispositions (embodied in social value orientations) and situation-specific features may 
both drive cooperative behavior.  Social interaction in mixed-motive interdependence 
situations is best predicted by a disposition x situation interaction (Van Lange, 2000; 
Van Lange, Agnew, Harinck, & Steemers, 1997a), such that the influences of social 
value orientations on cooperative behavior should be larger in ambiguous than in 
unambiguous situations.  In the latter situations, cooperative behavior may rather follow 
from individuals' susceptibility to situation-specific features. 
Our objective is to extend and test this perspective.  We will test whether 
susceptibility of individuals to disambiguating situation-specific features depends not 
only on the nature, but also on the consistency of one's own social value orientation. 
We also examine whether subtle situation-specific features may be strong enough to 
disambiguate a situation.  We test our view by unobtrusively confronting our 
participants with either morality-related features or with might-related features. 
3 Interdependence Theory 
Behaving cooperatively towards others involves departure from the individual's 
self-interested preferences (i.e., given preferences).  Movement away from given 
preferences results from transformation of motivation, a process that may lead 
individuals to relinquish their immediate self-interest and to act on the basis of broader 
goals (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; see also Rusbult & Van Lange, 1996).  Transformation 
of motivation yields a re-conceptualized, effective set of preferences, which are 
assumed to directly guide cooperative behavior. 
Several transformation processes have been identified (see Allison & Messick, 
1990; Griesinger &  Livingston, 1975; MacCrimmon & Messick, 1976; McClintock, 
1972; Messick &  McClintock, 1968).  They are often categorized into two broad 
categories.  A first category of transformation processes is a pro-social transformation, 
including cooperation (MaxJoint, i.e., maximizing joint outcomes), equality (MinDiff, 
i.e., minimizing absolute differences between one's own and others' outcomes) and 
altruism (MaxOther, i.e., maximizing the others' outcomes with little or no 
consideration about one's own outcomes).  Recently, Van Lange (1999) found evidence 
for an integrative model of pro-social transfonnations.  He established that cooperation 
and equality are positively associated with each other, i.e. individuals engaged in pro-
social transformations assigned greater weight to both outcomes for self and others and 
to equality in outcomes.  This means that if individuals want to enhance joint outcomes, 
they also want to enhance equality in outcomes.  A second category of transformation 
processes is a pro-self transfonnation, including individualism' (MaxOwn, i.e., 
maximizing one's own outcomes with little or no consideration about others' outcomes) 
and competition (MaxRel, i.e., maximizing the difference between one's own and 
others' outcomes).  Both individualism and competition can be conceptualized as pro-
self transformations, because they both focus on enhancing outcomes for the self (e.g., 
Van Lange & Liebrand, 1989, 1991a, 1991b). 
Individuals repeatedly encounter patterns of interdependence and therefore the 
transformation process may occur automatically.  It has been found that 
transformational tendencies may be shaped by social dispositions, often referred to as 
social value orientations.  However, transfonnation may also depend on situation-
specific features: in some situations (e.g., a communal environment) individuals may 
routinely engage in pro-social transformation; whereas in other situations (e.g., a 
business environment) individuals may typically behave individualistically. 
4 Cooperative behavior, through the activation of transformation processes, is therefore 
assumed to result from both dispositional and situational influences. 
Impact of Social Value Orientations and Situation-Specific Features on Cooperative 
Behavior 
A large body of research has focused on individual differences in preferences for 
particular types of transformations, reflecting the way in which outcomes for self and 
others are evaluated'.  These individual differences have been referred to as social value 
orientations (Messick & McClintock, 1968; McClintock & Liebrand, 1988).  Some 
individuals (called pro-socials) are more inclined to behave in a pro-social manner, 
whereas others (called pro-selfs) are more inclined to behave in a pro-self manner. 
Social value orientations have been found to predict fairly accurately cooperative 
behavior in all kinds of mixed-motive situations (e.g., De Dreu & Van Lange, 1995; 
Liebrand &  Van Run, 1985; McClintock & Allison, 1989; Van Lange & Liebrand, 
1989; Van Vugt, Meertens, &  Van Lange, 1995).  Pro-socials always tend to behave 
more cooperatively than pro-selfs. 
Social value orientations have also been found to influence perceptual and 
cognitive processes.  Whereas pro-selfs believe that most others will behave non-
cooperatively, pro-socials assume that other individuals are more heterogeneous in this 
respect, some behaving cooperatively and others behaving non-cooperatively (Kelley & 
Stahelski, 1970).  Social value orientations are also linked to differences in the way 
others' behavior is perceived.  Pro-socials tend to judge another person's behavior in 
terms of morality: Someone who behaves in a cooperative manner will be judged as a 
moral and honest person whereas someone who behaves in a non-cooperative manner 
will be judged as immoral and dishonest.  Pro-selfs tend to judge another person's 
behavior more in terms of might/competence: someone who acts cooperatively will be 
judged as a strong and competent person whereas someone who acts non-cooperatively 
will be judged as weak and unintelligent.  This difference in the way pro-socials versus 
pro-selfs judge other individuals' behavior is called the might-versus-morality 
phenomenon (e.g., Liebrand, Jansen, Rijken, & Suhre, 1986; McClintock & Liebrand, 
1988; Sattler & Kerr, 1991; Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994). 
Cooperative behavior may also be contingent upon situation-specific features, 
such as information about the partner (De Bruin & Van Lange, 1999) or specific 
features of the interpersonal relationship (e.g., Rusbult, Verette, Whitney, Slovik, & 
5 Lipkus, 1991; Van Lange, Rusbult, Drigotas, Arriaga, Witcher, & Cox, 1997c; 
Wieselquist, Rusbult, Foster, & Agnew, 1999).  Furthermore, activation of social norms 
can also have strong effects on the emergence of cooperative behavior in mixed-motive 
situations.  Hertel &  Kerr (2001) showed that priming a 'loyalty norm' led to greater in-
group favoritism in a resource allocation task than priming an  'equality norm'.  Studies 
such as these show that even subtle situation-specific features may significantly affect 
cooperative behavior in mixed-motive situations. 
The Combined Role of Social Value Orientations and Situation-Specific Features 
To be sure, one should not expect behavior to be influenced in an additive 
manner by individuals' social value orientation or the features of the situation.  Indeed, 
Van Lange (2000) argued that it would be dysfunctional for individuals to always 
approach interdependent others in the same manner.  He suggested that influences of 
social value orientations should only be large in ambiguous mixed-motive situations. 
Because mixed-motive situations are by definition ambiguous, lacking relevant cues to 
guide one's own cooperative behavior, dispositional influences should likely affect 
social interaction.  However, situation-specific features may disambiguate situations and 
provide cues to guide preferences and cooperative behavior.  Under such circumstances, 
dispositional influences should be substantially weaker and, instead, individuals should 
be highly susceptible to situation-specific features.  Assuming that participants 
encounter situations of non-correspondent outcomes with regularity, cooperative or 
non-cooperative behavior may become automatically associated with situation-specific 
features (Van Lange, 2000; Van Lange et a!.,  1997c; Wieselquist et a!.,  1999).  Bargh 
(1997; Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996) also argued that social behavior should be 
capable of becoming directly and automatically activated by the presence of subtle 
features in the environment. 
Therefore, comparing ambiguous with unambiguous situations, one should 
expect a disposition x situation interaction to emerge (Van Lange, 2000; see also Van 
Lange et a!.,  1997a). Generally speaking, Van Lange et a!. (1997a) argued it is more 
useful to consider interactions between social value orientations and situational features 
in addition to additive models focusing on either dispositional influences or situation-
specific influences. 
A study conducted by Kramer, McClintock, and Messick (1986) provides a clear 
illustration of this view.  These authors studied the impact of social value orientations in 
6 two types of resource dilemma situations: a situation in which a common resource 
depletes rapidly and a situation in which a common resource is sustained through 
replenishment.  Social value orientations only predicted cooperative behavior in the 
rapid depletion condition: pro-selfs took more for themselves than pro-socials.  In the 
rapid depletion condition the conflict between self-interest and collective interest was 
most acute because feedback given about the rate of the common resource indicated that 
the future of that source was seriously threatened.  In contrast, in the sustained use 
condition, the cooperative behavior of pro-socials and pro-se1fs was highly similar 
across trials.  Pro-socials and pro-selfs appeared to convert the given situation according 
to the same transformation processes.  Kramer et al. (1986) argued that individuals in 
this condition were highly susceptible to implicit group norms promoting conformity 
activated by the sustained character of the situation.  These activated norms might have 
functioned as disambiguators. 
Individual Differences in Susceptibility to Situation-Specific Features: The Role of 
Consistency of Social Value Orientations 
In a recent study, Hertel & Fiedler (1998) argued that susceptibility to situation-
specific features in mixed-motive situations may well depend on the consistency of 
one's social value orientation.  Participants were confronted with subtle situation-
specific features (i.e., primes) related to cooperation or competition.  The effect of 
primes was assessed on allocation behavior in the Ring Measure of Social Values 
(Liebrand, 1984).  The Ring Measure is a technique that allows assessing a person's 
social value orientation along with its consistency (e.g., Liebrand, 1984; Liebrand & 
McClintock, 1988).  Hertel & Fiedler (1998) used the consistency of choices in the Ring 
Measure as an individual difference variable and found that only low consistent 
individuals were highly susceptible to the primes.  Specifically, the behavior of these 
individuals assimilated to the primes with more cooperative behavior in cooperative 
priming conditions and less cooperative behavior in competitive priming conditions. 
Hertel & Fiedler (1998) argued that a low consistent individual's social value 
orientation is not strong enough to resist priming influences.  High consistent 
individuals were less influenced by the cooperative or competitive primes, supposedly 
because in their case priming influences may be overridden by strong individual 
dispositions. On the basis of these findings, Hertel & Fiedler (1998) suggested that 
consistency of one's social value orientation may moderate the interaction between the 
7 nature of social value orientation (pro-social vs. pro-self) and the impact of situation-
specific features. Because Hertel & Fiedler (1998) did not use a standardized technique 
for measuring social value orientations before the priming phase, their results do not 
allow making specific predictions for pro-socials and pro-selfs separately and it may be 
assumed that the impact of relevant situational features (i.e., primes) was similar for 
both pro-socials and pro-se1fs. 
The Purpose of the Present Experiments 
Building upon the work by Hertel and Fiedler (1998), we decided to further 
examine the combined impact of dispositional and situational factors on people's 
cooperative behavior. We conducted four experiments to test the interaction between the 
consistency and nature of social value orientations and situation-specific features.  In so 
doing, we in fact adapted van Lange's (2000) view by predicting that the disposition x 
situation interaction only occurs for low consistent individuals but not for high 
consistent individuals. 
Our four experiments had all the same structure.  In a first phase, we measured 
each participant's social value orientation and the consistency of that orientation.  In a 
second phase, participants were confronted with 'morality' primes, neutral primes or 
'might' primes using supraliminal or subliminal priming techniques (Bargh, 1997; 
Bargh & Chartrand, 2000).  Finally, we observed the priming effects on cooperative 
behavior in one-trial mixed-motive games. 
The heart of our predictions concerned a three-way interaction involving the 
nature of participants' social value orientation, its consistency, and the direction 
suggested by the primes. That is, we expected to find the interaction between the 
dispositional and situational factors only in the group of low consistent individuals.  For 
this group of individuals, we expected only a significant impact of social value 
orientations in ambiguous situations (i.e., the neutral priming condition) but not in 
unambiguous situations.  We expected a situation with morality features to elicit more 
cooperative behavior than an ambiguous situation, and a situation with might features to 
elicit less cooperative behavior than an ambiguous situation.  Because high consistent 
individuals should not be susceptible to disambiguating situation-specific features, we 
predicted only a main effect of social value orientations indicating that high consistent 
pro-socials act more cooperatively than high consistent pro-selfs in ambiguous 
8 situations as well as in situations with morality or might features.  In other words, high 
consistent individuals' cooperative behavior should not be influenced by primes3. 
EXPERIMENT 1 
Some features of this study deserve attention.  First of all, unlike Hertel & 
Fiedler (1998), we conducted the Ring Measure of Social Values (Liebrand, 1984), as a 
measure of social value orientations and consistency of these orientations, before the 
priming phase.  Second, we used a one-trial simultaneous 2-person give-some game 
(e.g., Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994).  Participants had to make one choice without 
having any information about their partner.  We wanted to observe priming effects as 
purely as possible, and we wanted to rule out that our participants used their partner's 
choice as a basis for making their own choice.  Third, following the might-versus-
morality effect (see Liebrand et aI., 1986; Sattler &  Kerr, 1991), we used morality 
primes to activate cooperative behavior and might primes to activate non-cooperative 
behavior. 
We predicted only a main effect of social value orientations for high consistent 
individuals.  High consistent pro-socials should behave more cooperatively than high 
consistent pro-selfs (Hypothesis 1).  Furthermore, we expected a main effect of primes 
on cooperative behavior for low consistent individuals.  We predicted morality primes 
to elicit more cooperative behavior than neutral primes and we predicted might primes 
to elicit less own cooperative behavior than neutral primes (Hypothesis 2). Finally, we 
predicted a significant interaction between social value orientation and primes for low 
consistent individuals.  Low consistent pro-socials were expected to behave more 
cooperatively than low consistent pro-selfs only in the neutral priming condition 
(Hypothesis 3). 
Participants and design 
The participants were 203 undergraduates at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, 
as a partial fulfillment of course requirements.  All were native Dutch speakers.  The 
experimental design included three between-subjects factors.  These three factors were 
social value orientation (pro-social versus pro-self), consistency (high versus low), and 
primes (morality versus neutral versus might).  The dependent variable was 
participants' own cooperative behavior in a prisoner's dilemma game. 
9 Procedure and materials 
Upon entering the laboratory, participants were welcomed by a male 
experimenter.  They were told that they would participate in a number of unrelated 
experiments, and brought to individual soundproof cubicles.  They were requested to 
perform a sequence of four tasks: (a) the Ring Measure of Social Values; (b) a filler 
task; (c) the priming procedure and (d) a simultaneous, single-trial prisoner's dilemma 
task.  After participants completed all these tasks, they were requested to fill out a post-
experimental questionnaire.  Finally, they were thanked for their participation and 
debriefed. 
Measuring Social Value Orientations and Consistency 
The experiment started by assessing each participant's social value orientation 
and consistency, using the Ring Measure of Social Values (Liebrand, 1984).  The Ring 
Measure is a computerized task that confronts participants with 24 choice trials.  Each 
trial presents a pair of imaginary money distributions among the self and another 
person.  Amounts of money for the self and for the other person can be either positive or 
negative. An example of a pair is the choice between Alternative A:  1450 BEF for the 
self and 300 BEF for the other and Alternative B: 1500 BEF and 0 BEF for the other. 
The 24 pairs of outcomes lie on a circle in the own/other outcome plane defined by two 
orthogonal dimensions: a horizontal dimension representing the outcomes for the self 
and a vertical dimension representing the outcomes for the other person.  Specific 
own/other outcomes are defined as points in the plane.  The center of the circle 
coincides with the origin of the outcome plane, i.e., the origin denotes 0 BEF for the self 
and 0 BEF for the other person.  The radius of the circle is 1500 BEF (1  US dollar is 
about 45 BEF).  Each pair consists of two equidistant own/other outcome distributions 
that are located next to each other on the circle.  For each of the 24 pairs, participants 
were instructed to choose their most preferred alternative. 
After the participants made all their 24 choices, we calculated the total amount 
of money allocated to the self and the total amount of money allocated to the other 
person.  These two totals can be represented as coordinates on the horizontal (own 
outcomes) and vertical (other's outcomes) axis, defining a single point in the plane. 
This point provides an estimate of the direction of the participant's orientation vector in 
the outcome plane.  The vector represents the participant's social value orientation. 
Each orientation reflects a unique pattern of choices.  Participants are classified on the 
Ring Measure as making choices consistent with one of the orientations.  Participants 
10 with orientation vectors falling between 22.5° and 112.5° were classified as pro-socials 
and participants with orientation vectors falling between 292.5° (or -67.5°) and 22.5" 
were classified as pro-selfs.  Of the 203 participants, 101 could be identified as pro-
socials and 98 could be identified as pro-selfs.  Four participants could not be identified 
because they had an orientation vector of exactly 22.5°. 
We used the Ring Measure not only to determine each participant's social value 
orientation but also to determine the consistency of each orientation.  A maximal 
consistency score implies that the participant's preferred orientation on the Ring 
Measure remains consistent across all trials (Liebrand, 1984).  This consistency score 
will decrease when participants follow another orientation on some trials.  We decided 
to label participants who obtained a consistency score of at least 90% as individuals 
with a high consistent social value orientation and participants who obtained a 
consistency score of at most 85  % as individuals with a low consistent social value 
orientation.  Participants who scored between 85% and 90% were discarded from the 
analysis.  We did not perform a common median split on the consistency scores because 
we really wanted to create a clear distinction between participants who displayed a very 
high consistency score and participants who yielded a lower consistency score.  We 
wanted to make this distinction even more clearly by omitting participants who fell in 
between our two criteria (i.e., between 85% and 90%).  The average level of consistency 
was 88.3%.  Of the remaining 199 participants, 110 could be labeled as high consistent 
individuals and 86 could be labeled as low consistent individuals'.  Three additional 
participants were discarded from the analysis because they exhibited a consistency score 
between 85% and 90% or because they had a consistency score that was less than 60%. 
This means that a total of 196 participants remained for the analysis.  Fifty-three 
participants were classified as high consistent pro-socials, 45 participants were 
classified as low consistent pro-socials, 57 participants were classified as high 
consistent pro-se1fs, and 41 participants were classified as low consistent pro-selfs5• 
After the Ring Measure, all participants took part in a filler-experiment that took 
15 minutes. Participants had to categorize several objects into different color categories 
(e.g., a banana into the yellow category), and were later asked how many objects they 
could remember. 
Priming manipulation 
We used the Scrambled Sentence Test (Srull & Wyer, 1979) as a supraliminal 
priming technique.  The task was introduced to the participants as a "language skill" 
11 test.  We used of 30 items, each requiring the participant to form a grammatically 
correct sentence out of four words from five words presented in a scrambled sentence. 
Word primes were embedded in 15 of the 30 items.  We created three versions of the 
Scrambled Sentence Test, each with 15 different prime words.  A first version used 
words related to morality (e.g., honest, trustworthy, fair).  A second version used words 
related to mighUcompetence (e.g., determined, smart, autonomous).  A third version 
existed of words that were neutral and unrelated to any possible disambiguating feature 
(e.g., old, curved, silent). 
Measuring cooperation in a one-trial simultaneous 2-person give-some game 
We introduced the mixed-motive game in the form of a decision task.  Each 
participant was told that s/he was paired with another participant in the laboratory.  The 
game was adopted from prior research (e.g., Van Lange, 1999, Study 3; Van Lange & 
Kuhlman, 1994).  Each participant was given four chips and was told that the partner 
also received four chips.  For both players in the game, each chip had a value of 10 BEF 
to themselves and a value of 20 BEF to the partner.  Participants had to decide how 
many chips (none, one, two, three, or four) they would give to the partner.  They were 
also told that the partner also had to decide how many chips s/he would give to the 
participant.  Each chip the participant would receive from the partner would also be 
worth 20 BEF.  Maximal cooperation was to give four chips and maximal non-
cooperation was to give zero chipso.  Participants could end up with a total amount 
between 0 BEF and 120 BEF.  Participants did not receive any information about the 
partner.  In reality, this 2-person give-some game was a fictitious game.  All participants 
understood the task structure and, therefore, no additional data were excluded.  After 
participants made their decision, they were requested to fill out a post-experimental 
questionnaire, which probed their suspicion about any relatedness among tasks and on 
the priming procedure.  None of the participants indicated any suspicion.  Finally, 
students were thanked for their participation and debriefed. 
Results 
A 2 (social value orientation: pro-social vs. pro-self) x 2 (consistency: high vs. 
low) x 3 (primes: morality vs. neutral. vs. might) between-subjects ANOVA was 
conducted on cooperative behavior.  This analysis revealed the presence of two 
significant main effects.  First, we obtained a main effect of social value orientation, 
12 F(l, 184) = 23.10, 12 < .001.  Pro-socials eM = 2.16) showed more cooperation than pro-
selfs eM = 1.48).  Second, a main effect of primes, E(2, 184) = 36.50, 12 < .001 revealed 
that morality primes (M = 2.48) produced significantly more cooperation than neutral 
primes (M =  1.95), which in turn produced significantly more cooperation than might 
primes eM =  1.04). 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
Furthermore, we obtained a significant three-way interaction between social 
value orientation, consistency, and primes, E(2, 184) = 6.99, 12 < .01.  The means for this 
three-way interaction are shown in Figure 1.  To further analyze this interaction, we 
conducted separated 2 (social value: pro-social vs. pro-self) x 3 (primes: morality vs. 
neutral vs. might) between-subjects ANOV  As for high consistent participants and for 
low consistent participants. 
For high consistent participants, the analysis unexpectedly revealed two 
significant main effects.  First, we obtained the predicted main effect of social value 
orientation, E(1, 104) = 32.99, 12 < .001.  High consistent pro-socials (M = 2.26) 
displayed greater cooperation than high consistent pro-selfs (M =  1.19).  Second, the 
analysis showed also a main effect of  primes, E(2, 104) =  12.07,12 < .001.  Might primes 
(M = 1.08) elicited significantly less cooperation than morality primes eM = 2.05) and 
neutral primes eM =  2.04).  However, these main effects were qualified by a significant 
two-way interaction between social value orientation and primes, F(2, 104) =  9.92, 12 < 
.001.  Post-hoc comparisons using Tukey HSD showed indicated that high consistent 
pro-socials cooperated more than high consistent pro-selfs in the neutral priming 
condition eM =  2.41 vs. M =  1.68) and in the morality priming condition eM =  3.16 vs. 
M =  0.94), but not in the might priming condition (M =  1.22 and M =  0.95).  Post-hoc 
comparisons also revealed that high consistent pro-socials showed greater cooperation 
in the morality priming condition eM = 3.16) than in the neutral priming condition eM = 
2.41) and showed less cooperation in the might priming condition (M =  1.22) than in the 
neutral priming condition.  Additional post-hoc comparisons indicated that high 
consistent pro-selfs showed less cooperation in the morality priming condition (M = 
0.94) and in the might priming condition eM =  0.95) than in the neutral priming 
condition eM = 1.68).  There was no significant difference between high consistent pro-
13 selfs in the morality priming condition and those in the might priming condition.  These 
results disconfirm Hypothesis 1. 
Turning to the low consistent participants, the analysis only revealed the 
presence of a significant main effect of primes, .E(2, 80) = 28.85, Q < .001.  As predicted 
by Hypothesis 2, morality primes CM = 2.90) elicited greater cooperation than neutral 
primes (M =  1.86), .E(2, 80) =  16.71, Q < .001, whereas might primes CM =  0.99) elicited 
less cooperation than neutral primes CM = 1.86), EO,80) = 11.17, Q < .01.  In order to 
test Hypothesis 2, we calculated a planned comparison between low consistent pro-
socials and low consistent pro-selfs in the neutral priming condition.  This marginally 
significant contrast revealed that low consistent pro-socials exhibited more own 
cooperative behavior than low consistent pro-selfs in the neutral priming condition (M = 
2.23 vs. M =  1.50), EO, 80) =  3.87, Q < .06.  Additional planned comparisons revealed 
no significant differences between low consistent pro-socials and low consistent pro-
selfs in the morality priming condition CM =  2.88 and M =  2.92), EO, 80) < 1, ns, and in 
the might priming condition (M =  1.06 vs. M =  0.92), EO, 80) < 1, ns.  Hypotheses 2 
and 3 were supported. 
Discussion 
These results of Experiment 1 only partially supported our predictions. 
Although we did not obtain a statistically significant disposition x situation interaction 
pattern for low consistent individuals, the pattern clearly showed that social value 
orientations only affected cooperative behavior in the neutral priming condition and not 
in the morality and might priming conditions.  Furthermore, cooperative behavior of 
low consistent individuals shifted in prime consistent directions.  Our predictions for 
high consistent individuals were not supported.  Instead of only a main effect of social 
value orientation, we obtained a disposition x situation interaction, which indicated that, 
contrary to Hertel & Fiedler (1998), high consistent individuals were in fact sensitive to 
the primes.  High consistent pro-socials' cooperative behavior clearly assimilated to the 
primes.  This pattern suggests that they may remain sensitive to the context and behave 
cooperatively or non-cooperatively depending on situation-specific features.  High 
consistent pro-selfs' behavior however assimilated to the primes in the might priming 
condition only. Indeed, high consistent pro-selfs actually behaved less cooperatively in 
the morality than in the neutral priming condition. 
14 How can we explain why high consistent pro-selfs exhibited the same degree of 
(non-) cooperative behavior in might and morality priming conditions?  Is it possible 
that morality features directly lead high consistent pro-selfs to behave selfishly?  An 
explanation may be offered by referring to earlier work by Herr (1986; see also 
Neuberg, 1988).  Herr (1986) suggested that in mixed-motive interdependence 
situations beliefs about partner's cooperation likely playa central role in connecting 
situation-specific features with cooperative behavior.  It might be that, in Experiment 1, 
our participants engaged in some sort of a spontaneous expectation formation process. 
Previous social dilemma research already demonstrated that expectations of partner's 
cooperation serve as an important ingredient in an individual's decision (e.g., Van 
Lange & Kuhlman, 1994; Kuhlman & Wimberley, 1975).  Interdependence theory and 
related perspectives (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; McClintock, Kramer, & Keil, 1984; 
Messick & Cook, 1983) also stated that cooperative behavior may be shaped by 
expectations or beliefs regarding pro-social intentions and behavior by the partner. 
Research also indicated that the extent to which expectations serve as an ingredient for 
behaving in dilemmas may depend on one's social value orientation.  Pro-socials are 
found to follow a 'behavioral assimilation' principle (Kelley & Stahelski, 1970).  These 
individuals desire reciprocity: they act cooperatively as long as they expect the other to 
cooperate but act selfishly if they expect the other be a non-cooperative individual.  Pro-
selfs are less guided by considerations of reciprocity and rather exhibit tendencies to 
exploit cooperative behavior of interdependent others. 
Building upon this analysis, we suggest that participants in Experiment 1 
engaged in some expectation formation process, and that the resulting expectations were 
influenced by the presence of the primes.  In the neutral priming condition, lacking a 
situation-based direction, participants' expectations may have been influenced by their 
social value orientation.  Kuhlman & Kimberley (1976) indeed found that pro-socials 
expected more cooperation from other individuals than pro-selfs in an ambiguous 
mixed-motive setting.  In situations with more explicit indications (e.g., the morality 
and might priming conditions), individuals may rely on the nature of the primes to form 
expectations.  Morality features being linked to cooperative persons (Deutsch, 1982; 
Liebrand et al., 1986; Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994), they could have encouraged 
participants to expect a high degree of cooperation from the partner.  Might features 
being linked to non-cooperative persons (Liebrand et aI.,  1986; Sattler & Kerr, 1991; 
Van Lange & Liebrand, 1989), they could have induced participants to expect a low 
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of partner's cooperation may have triggered specific behavioral tendencies. 
The above rationale can easily account for the fact that high consistent pro-
socials as well as low consistent individuals showed behavioral assimilation to the 
primes (Kelley & Stahelski, 1970).  More importantly, such an explanation also clarifies 
why high consistent pro-selfs did not always show behavioral assimilation.  As a matter 
of fact, they acted in a non-cooperative manner in the neutral priming condition and 
played more competitively after their confrontation with might primes.  However, they 
also played more non-cooperatively in case of morality primes.  If  morality primes 
caused these individuals to perceive their partner as a cooperative person, than their 
non-cooperative reaction could be typified as  'exploitation'. In other words, because 
high consistent pro-selfs likely judge cooperative others as rather weak and stupid 
persons who are very exploitable, they are tempted to adopt a non-cooperative strategy. 
Our next experiments were undertaken in order to test the intriguing hypothesis 
that expectations are spontaneously formed in a mixed-motive situation.  We predicted 
that dispositional and situation-specific features would influence participants' 
expectations of their partner's cooperation, depending on the ambiguity of the situation. 
Next, we expected these expectations to be used by participants to determine their own 
cooperative behavior.  Clearly, the way such expectations would serve as an ingredient 
for making decisions was expected to be moderated by the nature and consistency of the 
social value orientation. 
EXPERIMENT 2 
The purpose of this experiment was to replicate the findings of Experiment 1 
and to assess the viability of our interpretation.  For Experiment 2, we hypothesized a 
main effect of primes on expectations of partner's cooperation: morality primes should 
elicit more expected cooperation of the partner than neutral primes and might primes 
should elicit less expected cooperation of the partner than neutral primes (Hypothesis 
1).  We also predicted a main effect of social value orientation on expectations of 
partner's cooperation: Generally speaking, pro-socials should expect more cooperation 
from their partners than pro-selfs (Hypothesis 2), but the effect should be larger in the 
neutral priming condition than in the morality and might priming conditions 
(Hypothesis 3).  As far as cooperative behavior is concerned, we hypothesized that 
(high and low consistent) pro-socials should behave more cooperatively than (high and 
16 low consistent) pro-selfs in the neutral priming condition (Hypothesis 4).  We expected 
high consistent pro-socials and low consistent participants to act more cooperatively in 
the morality priming condition than in the neutral priming condition and less 
cooperatively in the might priming condition than in the neutral priming condition 
(Hypothesis 5).  High consistent pro-selfs should behave less cooperatively in the 
morality and might priming conditions than in the neutral priming condition 
(Hypothesis 6). Finally, we expected correlations between expectations of partner's 
cooperation and own cooperative behavior to be positive and to be negative for high 
consistent pro-selfs in the morality priming condition (Hypothesis 7). 
Participants and design 
In total 193 students at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven participated in the 
experiment as partial fulfillment of course requirements.  All were native Dutch 
speakers.  The experimental design included the same three between-subjects factors as 
in Experiment 1.  We assessed expectations of partner's cooperation as well as each 
participant's own cooperative behavior. 
Procedure and materials 
The procedure was, except for the assessment of participants' expectations of 
partner's cooperation, identical to the procedure in Experiment 1.  The experiment 
started by assessing each participant's social value orientation and consistency.  Of the 
193 participants, 98 could be identified as pro-socials and 94 could be identified as pro-
selfs.  One participant could not be identified because of an orientation vector of exactly 
22.5°.  The average level of consistency was 85.6%.  Of the remaining 192 participants, 
98 could be labeled as high consistent individuals and 88 could be labeled as low 
consistent individuals.  Six additional participants were discarded from the analysis 
because they exhibited a consistency score between 85% and 90% or because they had a 
consistency score that was less than 60%.  This means that a total of 186 participants 
remained for the analyses.  Fifty participants were classified as high consistent pro-
socials, 45 participants as low consistent pro-socials, 48 participants as high consistent 
pro-selfs, and 43 participants as low consistent pro-selfs. 
After finishing the filler-experiment, participants were randomly assigned to one 
of three priming conditions (morality vs. neutral vs. might primes).  Immediately after 
17 resolving the thirty sentences of the Scrambled Sentence Test, participants took part in 
the same fictitious 2-person give-some game as in Experiment 1.  In addition to the 
procedure of Experiment 1, we asked each participant the following question: "How 
many chips do you expect the other will give to you?"  Whereas one half of the 
participants received this question before making their own decision; the other half 
received this question after making their own decision  7.  All participants understood the 
task structure and, therefore, no additional data were excluded.  Afterwards, participants 
also had to fill out a post-experimental questionnaire.  None of the participants indicated 
any suspicion on the priming procedure or on any relatedness among the different tasks 
of the experiment.  Finally, after making their decisions, participants were thanked for 
their participation and debriefed 
Expectations of partner's cooperation 
We conducted a 2 (social value orientation: pro-social vs. pro-self) x 2 
(consistency: high vs. low) x 3 (primes: morality vs. neutral vs. might) between-subjects 
ANOV  A on expectations of partner's cooperation.  This analysis revealed two 
significant main effects.  We obtained the predicted main effect of primes, .E(2,  174) = 
61.39,12< .001.  In line with Hypothesis 1, planned comparisons revealed that morality 
primes elicited higher expectations of partner's cooperation than neutral primes (M = 
2.93 vs. M =  2.26), .EO, 174) =  20.86, p < .001, and that might primes elicited lower 
expectations of partner's cooperation than neutral primes (M = 1.30 vs. M =  2.26), .E(l, 
174) = 41.64, 12 < .001. 
There was also a significant main effect of social value orientation, .EO,  l74) = 
7.74, P < .01, which revealed that pro-socials CM = 2.33) expected significantly more 
cooperation from their partners than pro-selfs (M = 1.99).  A planned comparison 
revealed that there was a significant difference between pro-socials and pro-selfs at the 
neutral priming level CM =  2.56 vs. M =  1.96), .EO, 174) =  8.08, p < .01. No such 
difference emerged at the morality priming level (M = 2.96 and M = 2.90), .EO,  l74) < 
1, ns, and only a marginally significant difference was found at the might priming level 
(M =  1.48 and. M =  1.13), .EO, 174) =  2.84, P < .lD.  In line with Hypothesis 3, the 
difference between pro-socials and pro-selfs was significantly larger at the neutral 
priming level than at the morality priming level, !(l23) = 3.89, 12 < .001, and than at the 
might priming level, 1(122) = 1.74, p < .05.  The difference between pro-social and pro-
18 selfs was also significantly larger at the might priming level than at the morality priming 
level, 1(121) =  2.09,!! < .05. 
Own coo!!erative behavior 
We conducted a 2 (social value orientation: pro-social vs. pro-self) x 2 
(consistency: high vs. low) x 3 (primes: morality vs. neutral vs. might) between-subjects 
ANOV  A on own cooperative behavior in the give-some task.  This analysis revealed the 
presence of two significant main effects.  First, a main effect of social value orientation, 
.E(l, 174) =  35.59,!! < .001, indicated that pro-socials (M =  2.22) cooperated more than 
pro-se1fs (M = 1.38).  Second, a main effect of primes, .E(2, 174) = 30.99,!! < .001, 
revealed that morality primes eM = 2.37) elicited significantly more own cooperative 
behavior than neutral primes eM =  1.98), while might primes eM =  1.06) elicited 
significantly less own cooperative behavior than neutral primes. 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
Replicating the pattern found in Experiment 1, we also obtained a significant 
three-way interaction between social value orientation, consistency, and primes, .E(2, 
174) =  9.72, !! < .001.  The means of this interaction, together with the expectation 
means, are represented in Figure 2.  To test Hypothesis 4, we conducted two planned 
comparisons at the neutral priming level.  A first planned comparison revealed that high 
consistent pro-socials behaved more cooperatively than high consistent pro-selfs in the 
neutral priming condition eM = 2.47 vs. M = 1.75), .Eel, 92) = 4.35,!! < .05.  A second 
planned comparison revealed that low consistent pro-socials behaved more 
cooperatively than low consistent pro-selfs in the neutral priming condition eM =  2.20 
vs. M =  1.48), .E(l, 80) =  4.28,!! < .05.  As a consequence, Hypothesis 4 is clearly 
supported. 
To test Hypothesis 5, we performed two planned comparisons.  A first planned 
comparison revealed that high consistent pro-socials and low consistent individuals 
cooperated more in the morality priming condition than in the neutral priming 
condition, eM = 2.96 vs. M = 2.06), .E(l,174) = 20.95,!! < .0001.  A second planned 
comparison revealed that high consistent pro-socials and low consistent individuals 
cooperated less in the might priming condition than in the neutral priming condition, (M 
= 1.10 vs. M = 2.06), .E(l,174) = 22.74,!! < .0001.  These results provide unambiguous 
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neutral primes for high consistent pro-selfs also confirmed Hypothesis 6.  High 
consistent pro-selfs cooperated less in the morality and might priming conditions than in 
the neutral priming condition, eM =  0.78 vs. M =  1.75), En, 174) =  11.00,11 < .01. 
Relationship between expectations of partner's cooperation and own cooperative 
behavior 
Correlations were calculated to explore the relationship between expectations of 
partner's cooperation and own cooperative behavior (see Table 1).  All correlations, 
except the correlation for high consistent pro-selfs in the neutral priming condition, r =  -
.16, ns, N =  16, were significant.  The correlation between expectations and behavior for 
high consistent pro-selfs in the morality priming condition was strongly negative, r = -
.81, P < .0001, N =  16.  All the other correlations were strongly positive and ranged 
between .58 and .93. Such a pattern is highly supportive of Hypothesis 7. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
Discussion 
With respect to participants' cooperative behavior, we replicated the results of 
Experiment 1.  Moreover, we extended the results of  Experiment 1 by showing that 
social value orientation and situation-specific features combined to influence 
participants' expectations of partner's cooperation.  Specifically, the effect of social 
value orientation on expectations was only significant at the neutral priming level but 
not at the morality priming level or the might priming level.  In these conditions, the 
situation-specific features simply overrode the dispositional influences on expectations. 
A remarkable finding is that expectations of partner's cooperation assimilated to 
the primes for all subjects.  This highlights an important result of our study: Whereas 
expectations held by high consistent pro-selfs assimilated to morality primes, their 
behavior did not.  A strong negative correlation between the expectations and the 
behavior of high consistent pro-selfs also corroborated this contrast reaction.  This 
means that the more high consistent pro-selfs believed their partner to be cooperative 
the more they exploited him or her. 
20 High consistent pro-socials and low consistent individuals all showed strong 
positive correlations between expectations of partner's cooperation and own cooperative 
behavior.  This confirms that for these individuals expectations are an important 
ingredient for regulating behavioral assimilations.  High consistent pro-selfs in the 
neutral priming conditions are less affected by expectations and generally behaved in a 
non-cooperative manner.  High consistent pro-selfs are more affected by expectations in 
the morality and might priming conditions.  The strong positive correlation in the 
morality priming condition and the strong negative correlation in the might priming 
condition showed that these individuals were strongly inclined to, respectively, compete 
with non-cooperative others and exploit cooperative others. 
The results of Experiment 2 thus provide encouraging support for our 
explanation of  the results of Experiment 1 in terms of an expectation formation process. 
In the remaining experiments, we investigated whether this pattern could also be 
replicated when subliminal rather than supraliminal priming is used  (Experiment 3) and 
when a N-person dilemma game is proposed (Experiment 4). 
EXPERIMENT 3 
In Experiment 3 we wanted to investigate whether the priming effects on 
expectations of partner's behavior could also be obtained in a context that relies on 
unconscious priming.  This would dispel possible doubts about the impact of demand 
characteristics and the conscious or strategic nature of the obtained priming effects 
(Bargh & Chartrand, 2000).  We tried to replicate the results of  Experiment 2 using 
subliminal priming. Compared to Experiment 2, we omitted the neutral primes and only 
used morality and might primes. 
Participants and design 
One hundred forty students at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven participated in 
the experiment as partial fulfillment of course requirements.  Two participants were 
nonnative Dutch speakers and their data were excluded from all subsequent analyses. 
The experimental design included three between-subjects factors: social value 
orientation (pro-social vs. pro-self), consistency (high vs. low), and primes (morality vs. 
might).  As in Experiment 2, we assessed our participants' expectations of partner's 
cooperation and their own cooperative behavior in a 2-person prisoner's dilemma game. 
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The same procedure as in previous experiments was followed.  Of the 138 
participants, 64 could be identified as pro-socials and 68 could be identified as pro-selfs. 
Six participants could not be identified because of an orientation vector of exactly 22.5°. 
The average level of consistency was 86.1 %.  Of the remaining 132 participants, 67 
were labeled as high consistent individuals and 61  were labeled as low consistent 
individuals.  Four additional participants were discarded from the analysis because they 
exhibited a consistency score between 85% and 90% or because they had a consistency 
score that was less than 60%.  A total of 128 participants remained for the analyses. 
Thirty-two participants were classified as high consistent pro-socials, 30 participants as 
low consistent pro-socials, 35 participants as high consistent pro-selfs, and 31 
participants as low consistent pro-selfs. 
After performing the filler-task, participants were confronted with a subliminal 
priming experiment.  Participants were randomly assigned to one of two priming 
conditions (morality vs. might primes).  They were seated in front of a computer screen 
and told that they were going to perform a lexical decision task.  A series of letters 
strings was going to be presented on the screen and participants had to indicate after 
each presentation of a letter string whether this string was an existing word or not.  The 
participants were informed that each presentation would be very brief.  The lexical 
decision task started with 6 practice trials, followed by 30 experimental trials.  On each 
trial, a fixation point first appeared on the computer screen.  Participants had to press 
the key '2' to start the presentation of a letter string.  This letter string remained on the 
screen for 27 ms. and was immediately replaced by a mask ('XQFBZRMQWGBX'), 
which remained on the screen for 225 ms.  After each trial, participants faced a blank 
screen and were asked to indicate their decision by pressing a key on the keyboard (' 1  ' 
for an existing word, '3' for a non-word).  Once the answer was given, a new fixation 
point appeared on the screen after a 1500 ms. pause.  The same morality and might 
primes as in Experiments 1 and 2 were used.  All these words were used once.  Hence, 
the thirty experimental trials consisted of fifteen prime-words and fifteen non-words. 
The six practice trials and the thirty experimental trials were randomized for each 
participant. 
After participants completed the lexical decision task, they took part in the same 
fictitious 2-person give-some game as in Experiments 1 and 2.  Counterbalanced with 
the question about own choice, we also asked each participant about hislher 
22 expectations of their partner's cooperation.  All participants understood the task 
structure and, therefore, no additional data were excluded.  A post-experimental 
questionnaire ascertained that participants could not retrieve any of the presented 
primes.  Finally, after making their decisions, participants were thanked for their 
participation and debriefed. 
Results and discussion 
Expectations of partner's cooperation 
A 2 (social value orientation: pro-social vs. pro-self) x 2 (consistency: high vs. 
low) x 2 (primes: morality vs. might) between-subjects ANOVA on expectations of 
partner's cooperation was conducted.  This analysis revealed the presence of two 
significant main effects.  First of all, a main effect of social value orientation, EO, 120) 
=  8.32,:0 < .01, indicated that pro-socials <M =  2.01) had higher expectations of 
partner's cooperation than pro-selfs <M = 1.59).  Subsequent planned comparisons 
revealed that this main effect was due to a significant difference between pro-socials 
and pro-selfs at the morality priming level, <M =  2.96 vs. M =  2.31), E(I, 120) =  9.46,:0 
< .01, while there was no significant difference at the might priming level <M =  1.06 
and M = 0.88), E(1, 120) < 1, ns.  Second, a main effect of primes, E(l, 120) = 126.05,:0 
< .001, revealed that morality primes <M =  2.63) elicited higher expectations of 
partner's cooperation than might primes <M =  0.97). 
Own cooperative behavior 
We conducted a 2 (social value orientation: pro-social vs. pro-self) x 2 
(consistency: high vs. low) x 2 (primes: morality vs. might) between-subjects ANOVA 
on own cooperative behavior.  This analysis revealed three significant main effects. 
First of all, we obtained a main effect of social value orientation, E(l, 120) =  27.30,:0 < 
.0001.  Pro-socials <M =  1.95) displayed more cooperation than pro-selfs <M =  1.14). 
Second, a main effect of consistency, EO, 120) =  7.01, P < .01, revealed that low 
consistent participants <M = 1.75) displayed more cooperative behavior than high 
consistent participants (M =  1.34).  Primes showed a third significant main effect, E(l, 
120) = 81.89,:0 < .001, indicating that morality primes <M = 2.24) elicited more own 
cooperative behavior than might primes <M =  0.85). 
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There was also a significant three-way interaction between social value 
orientation, consistency, and primes, E(1, 120) = 18.43, Q < .001. Figure 3 presents the 
means of this interaction, together with the expectation means.  A planned comparison 
revealed that high consistent pro-socials and low consistent individuals cooperated more 
in the morality priming condition CM =  2.77) than in the might priming condition CM = 
0.88), E(1, 120) = 111.04,11 < .001.  Another planned comparison revealed that there 
was no significant difference for high consistent pro-selfs between the morality and the 
might priming condition, (M =  0.64 and M =  0.77), E(1,120) < 1, ns. 
Relationshil1 between eXl1ectations of l1artner' s cool1eration and own cool1erative 
behavior 
As in Experiment 2, we calculated correlations between expectations of 
partner's cooperation and own behavior.  All these correlations were statistically 
significant.  The correlation between expectations and behavior for high consistent pro-
selfs in the might priming condition was strongly negative, r = -.74, Q < .001, N =  17. 
All the other correlations were strongly positive and ranged between .66 and .89. 
Correlations are presented in Table 2. 
Insert Table 2 about here 
In Experiment 3, we again obtained evidence showing that expectations of 
partner's cooperation assimilated to the primes, even if participants were unaware of the 
priming influence.  Low consistent pro-selfs showed strong behavioral assimilation to 
beliefs of the partner, as did both groups of pro-socials.  High consistent pro-selfs 
however displayed the same degree of own cooperative behavior in the morality and 
might priming conditions.  The strong correlations showed that expectations of partner's 
cooperation were an important ingredient in their decisions, either to compete with a 
non-cooperative partner (positive correlation) or to exploit a cooperative partner 
(negative correlation). 
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In Experiment 4, we tried to obtain further support for the idea that expectations 
are spontaneously formed and play an important role in mixed-motive interdependence 
situations.  To obtain additional evidence we investigated whether this expectation 
formation process also occurs in a N-person mixed-motive game context.  There is a lot 
of evidence that expectations play an important role in a 2-person game (e.g., De Bruin 
& Van Lange, 1999; Kelley & Stahelski, 1970; Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994).  We 
raised the question whether individuals in a N-person game also spontaneously form 
expectations of other persons' cooperation.  There is not much evidence regarding 
whether expectations have an important information function in a N-person game just 
like in the 2-person game (for some evidence see Kuhlman & Wimberley, 1976). 
Research also remains silent as to how expectations of others' cooperation in a N-
person game affect own cooperative behavior.  In the present experiment, we 
investigated whether participants spontaneously create expectations of other 
individuals' cooperation and whether one's own cooperative behavior is strongly related 
to these expectations. 
We told our participants that they would participate in a lO-person divisible 
public-good game.  Apart from the number of individuals involved in the game, there is 
another difference with the game used in previous experiments.  In a 2-person game, 
one has to give to the partner and vice versa.  Given chips are considered as a loss.  In 
the lO-person game, participants were told that they had to give to the group as a whole 
(the value of what they gave would be doubled).  Afterwards, the monetary value of the 
group total would be divided by the number of individuals involved in the game (i.e., 
10).  This means that every participant would receive back one fifth of the original value 
of every own given chips.  This game had every characteristic of a dilemma game 
(Dawes, 1980): non-cooperation always yields higher outcomes than cooperation and 
mutual cooperation is always better than mutual non-cooperation. 
Participants and design 
One hundred sixty-seven students at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven 
participated in the experiment as partial fulfillment of course requirements.  All were 
native Dutch speakers.  The experimental design included the same three between-
subjects factors as in Experiments 1 and 2.  We also assessed expected cooperation of 
25 all the other participants in the lO-person game and the participant's own cooperative 
behavior. 
Procedure and materials 
We followed the same procedure as in the previous experiments.  Of the 167 
participants, 86 could be identified as pro-socials and 76 could be identified as pro-selfs. 
Five participants could not be identified because of an orientation vector of exactly 
22.5°.  The average level of consistency was 87.1 %.  Of the remaining 162 participants, 
78 were labeled as high consistent individuals and 77 were labeled as low consistent 
individuals.  Seven additional participants were discarded from the analysis because 
they exhibited a consistency score between 85% and 90% or because they had a 
consistency score that was less than 60%.  This means that a total of 155 participants 
remained for the analyses.  Of those remaining participants, 40 were classified as high 
consistent pro-socials, 41  as low consistent pro-socials, 38 as high consistent pro-selfs, 
and 36 as low consistent pro-selfs. 
After performing the filler-experiment, participants were instructed to resolve 
the same Scrambled-Sentence Test as in Experiments 1 or 2.  Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of three priming conditions (morality vs. neutral vs. might 
primes).  After completing the priming procedure, they took part in a one-trial 
simultaneous IO-person give-some game.  Participants were informed that they were 
members of a IO-person group, but they would not receive any information about the 
identity of their fellow group members.  All group members were given four chips, 
which could be used to invest.  The chips one did not invest would accrue totally to one-
self.  Each chip invested, however, would result in a group pay-off of two times the 
value of that chip.  The total group pay-off would be divided equally among all group 
members.  Each own chip had a value of 10 BEF. to the person himself or herself and a 
value of 20 BEF. to the group.  Participants were told that their task was to decide how 
many chips (none, one, two, three, or four) they would give to the group.  Maximal 
cooperation was to give four chips and maximal non-cooperation was to give zero chips. 
Participants were also told that all the other participants had to make the same decision. 
In reality, this game was fictitious. 
We also asked each participant about hislher expectations of the other members' 
cooperation ("How many chips do you think the other nine members will give 
collectively to the group?"), which was again counterbalanced with the own choice.  All 
26 participants comprehended the task structure and, therefore, no additional data were 
excluded.  Participants also did not indicate any suspicion on the priming procedure or 
on any relatedness among the different tasks of the experiment.  After making their 
decisions, participants were thanked for their participation and debriefed. 
Results and discussion 
Expectations of partners' cooperation 
A 2 (social value orientation: pro-social vs. pro-self) x 2 (consistency: high vs. 
low) x 3 (primes: morality vs. neutral vs. might) between-subjects ANOV  A on 
expectations of partners' cooperation was conducted.  This analysis revealed two 
significant main effects.  A main effect of social value orientation, .E(1, 143) =  12.31, p 
< .001, indicated that pro-socials eM = 21.11) expected more cooperation of the other 
members than pro-selfs eM =  18.60).  There was also a main effect of primes, .E(2, 143) 
=  95.37, p < .001.  Morality primes eM =  25.76) elicited higher expectations of partners' 
cooperation than neutral primes eM = 20.21) and might primes eM = 13.60) elicited 
lower expectations of partners' cooperation than neutral primes. 
These two main effects were qualified by an interaction between social value 
orientation and primes, .Ee2, 143) =  3.50, P < .05.  Planned comparisons clarified this 
two-way interaction by showing that pro-socials had higher expectations of their 
partners' cooperation than pro-selfs in the neutral priming condition (M =  22.78 vs. M = 
17.61), .E(1,  143) =  17.27, P < .0001, and not in the morality priming condition (M = 
26.60 vs. M =  24.92), .E(1, 143) =  1.90, ns, or in the might priming condition eM = 
13.96 vs. M = 13.25), .E(1, 143) < 1, llli.  Differences in means between pro-socials and 
pro-selfs were larger in the neutral priming condition than in the morality priming 
condition, !(03) = 3.66,11 < .001, and in the might priming condition, !(lOO) = 5.31, 11 < 
.001.  Differences in means between pro-socials and pro-selfs did not differ between the 
morality priming condition and the might priming condition, !(  101) =  1.14, ns. 
Own cooperative behavior 
A 2 (social value orientation: pro-social vs. pro-self) x 2 (consistency: high vs. 
low) x 3 (primes: morality vs. neutral. vs. might) between-subjects ANOV  A was 
conducted on own cooperative behavior in the fictitious lO-person game.  We found 
three significant main effects.  First of all, we obtained a main effect of social value 
orientation, .E0,143) =  51.54, 11 < .0001, which indicated that pro-socials eM =  2.55) 
27 cooperated more than pro-selfs CM = 1.65).  Second, we obtained a main effect of 
consistency, .E(l,143) = 9.22, Q < .01, showing that low consistent participants (M = 
2.29) cooperated more than high consistent participants (M = 1.91).  Third, we obtained 
a main effect of primes, .E(2,143) = 45.74, Q < .0001.  Morality primes CM = 2.73) 
elicited significantly more own cooperative behavior than neutral primes (M = 2.29), 
and might primes (M = 1.29) elicited significantly less own cooperative behavior than 
neutral primes. 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
The three-way interaction between social value orientation, consistency and 
primes reached a conventional level of significance, .E(2, 143) = 3.94, Q < .05.  The 
means for this three-way interaction, together with the expectations means, are shown in 
Figure 4.  The exact nature of this interaction was examined by means of a series of 
planned comparisons. 
Planned comparison calculated at the neutral priming level revealed that high 
consistent pro-socials cooperated more than high consistent pro-selfs (M = 2.84 vs. M= 
1.53), .EO, 143) = 18.32, Q < .001, and that low consistent pro-socials cooperated more 
than low consistent pro-selfs, CM = 2.71 vs. M = 2.08), .E(l, 143) = 4.24, Q < .05.  For 
high consistent pro-socials and low consistent individuals, a planned comparison 
revealed that there was more own cooperative behavior in the morality priming 
condition (M = 3.22) than in the neutral priming condition (M = 2.54), .E(l, 143) = 
16.34, Q < .001.  Another planned comparison revealed that high consistent pro-socials 
and low consistent individuals cooperated less in the might priming condition (M = 
1.39) than in the neutral priming condition CM = 2.54), .E(l, 143) = 42.35, Q < .001. 
Finally, we computed a planned comparison for high consistent pro-selfs comparing the 
morality and might priming conditions with the neutral priming conditions.  This 
comparison was significant, E(l, 143) = 3.00, Q < .05, and showed that high consistent 
pro-selfs once again cooperated less in the morality and might priming conditions (M = 
1.07) than in the neutral priming condition CM = 1.53). 
28 Relationship between expectations of partners' cooperation and own cooperative 
behavior 
Correlations between expectations and behavior were calculated and were all 
statistically significant (see Table 3).  There was a negative expectation-behavior 
correlation for high consistent pro-selfs in the morality priming condition, I = -.72,12 < 
.01, N = 13.  All the other expectation-behavior correlations were positive and ranged 
between .59 and .85. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
The results of Experiment 4 clearly replicated those of Experiments 2 and 3. 
Individuals also spontaneously form expectations in a lO-person game context.  Social 
value orientation and situational features jointly influenced expectations.  In the 
morality and might priming conditions, expectations assimilated to the primes. 
Expectations-behavior correlations generated strong positive correlations except for 
high consistent pro-selfs in the morality priming condition where a negative correlation 
was found. 
General Discussion 
On the role of expectations about the partner 
Previous research has found that both social value orientation and situation-
specific features impact on people's cooperative behavior.  More recently it was 
suggested that social interactions in mixed-motive settings reflect a disposition x 
situation interaction (Van Lange, 2000; Van Lange et a!.,  1997a), with dispositional 
influences playing a larger role in ambiguous than in unambiguous situations.  Building 
on the work by Hertel & Fiedler (1998), we predicted that the later interaction would be 
more pronounced among low than high consistent individuals.  Although we did not 
obtain the predicted statistical interaction between social value orientations and primes 
on cooperative behavior among the low consistent individuals, the results showed that 
both low consistent pro-self and low consistent pro-social individuals assimilated their 
behavior towards the primes, and that differences between these groups were obtained 
in the neutral priming condition only. We basically obtained the same pattern of data 
29 among the high consistent individuals, with the notable exception that high consistent 
pro-selfs contrasted their behavior away from the morality primes. 
We suggested an interpretation of the later intriguing contrastive finding in 
terms of an expectation formation process. We reasoned that the priming of morality 
concepts may have led high consistent pro-selfs to expect more cooperation from their 
partners, and to exploit them as a result of this impression. Results of Experiments 2, 3, 
and 4 confirmed our reasoning. Expectations about the partner's cooperation were 
significantly influenced both by participants' social value orientation and the nature of 
the supraliminal (Study 2 and 4) or subliminal (Study 3) primes. However, while 
correlations between the expectation and cooperation measures were significantly 
positive in all conditions, they came out significantly negative for high consistent pro-
selfs primed with morality related words.  This is an important finding as it shows that 
high consistent pro-selfs became less cooperative as they expected more cooperation 
from their partner. It is noteworthy that the formation of expectations occurred in a very 
spontaneous manner in the present research. This can be illustrated by the fact that, 
although expectations were measured in Experiment 2 but not in Experiment 1, we 
obtained the same pattern of data in both Experiments.  Moreover, expectations were 
elicited in very unobtrusive ways in the present studies (see for instance Exp. 3, which 
used a subliminal priming technique). 
As a whole, the present findings suggest that dispositional and situational 
influences may not directly impact on people's cooperative behavior in mixed-motive 
interdependence situations. Rather, these factors may guide people's impressions about 
their partner, and these impressions may in turn determine people's behavioral options. 
This suggestion in perfectly in line with previous empirical and theoretical work (e.g., 
Kelley &  Stahelski, 1970; Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Kuhlman & Wimberley, 1975; Van 
Lange &  Kuhlman, 1994), suggesting that expectations about the partner's cooperation 
is a crucial antecedent of decision-making in mixed-motive situations. 
Consistency of social value orientations 
Consistency of social value orientations has rarely been investigated in the 
literature (see also Hertel & Fiedler, 1998).  Our studies show that this factor may be an 
important moderator for future research on social value orientations.  As we saw, high 
consistent pro-selfs behaved in a different manner than low consistent pro-selfs in the 
morality priming condition.  Previous studies suggest that pro-selfs generally behave in 
an individualistic manner.  However, it has been proposed that pro-selfs start 
30 cooperating when they believe that the partner is a cooperative person and that his or 
her cooperativeness is due to moral, honest intentions (Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994; 
Van Lange &  Semin-Goossens, 1998).  Our findings suggest that the later effect may be 
true for low consistent pro-selfs only.  A study conducted by Smeesters, Van Avermaet, 
& Warlop (2001) actually tested this reasoning in a sequential dilemma game by giving 
participants information about personality characteristics and cooperative intentions 
regarding their partner.  Results showed that low consistent pro-selfs but not high 
consistent pro-selfs reciprocated the cooperative behavior of a moral person.  Hence, 
pro-self individuals should not be expected to all behave in the same way: the 
consistency of one's social orientation does make a difference. 
If  one focuses on the groups where behavioral assimilation was obtained (that is, 
the low-consistent pro-selfs, and the low and high consistent pro-social individuals), 
only slight differences emerged.  The pro-social individuals always acted in the same 
manner and low consistent pro-selfs differed from the pro-socials in the neutral priming 
condition only.  It was expected that pro-socials behaved more cooperatively than pro-
self individuals in the neutral priming conditions.  The interesting result is that 
behavioral differences vanished when the priming of morality or might concepts 
disambiguated the situation (more specifically, disambiguated participants' expectations 
about the partner).  Does this mean that in unambiguous situations, pro-socials and low 
consistent pro-selfs should be expected to always behave in the same manner?  Not 
necessarily.  It is clear that all these individuals will generally tend to behave less 
cooperatively when expecting a lack of cooperation from their partner, and more 
cooperatively when expecting cooperation from a moral partner (Van Lange & 
Kuhlman, 1994; Van Lange & Semin-Goossens, 1998).  Future research may however 
benefit from examining situations in which differences emerge among these individuals. 
For instance, Smeesters et al. (2001) recently found that high consistent pro-socials 
behave cooperatively in more types of unambiguous situations than low consistent 
individuals and that these individuals behave cooperatively in more types of 
unambiguous situations than high consistent pro-selfs. 
Biased Perception 
To the best of our knowledge, the present research is the first that evidenced 
behavioral contrasts following the subliminal priming of concepts.  Our results may thus 
have important implications for research on automaticity.  In that literature, there is 
strong support to the view that subtle situational influences may have a direct impact on 
31 social behavior (e.g., Bargh et aI., 1996; Carver, Ganellen, Froming, & Chambers, 1983; 
Dijksterhuis & Comeille, 2001; Dijksterhuis &  Van Knippenberg, 1998; for reviews see 
Bargh &  Ferguson, 2000; Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001).  Direct influences are assumed 
to operate via the activation of mentally represented traits, stereotypes, or goals (Bargh, 
1997).  Recently, some authors argued that some findings obtained under the automatic 
behavior framework may actually be explained by a biased perception principle (see 
Wheeler & Petty, 2001; see also Herr, 1986; Neuberg, 1988). This principle refers to a 
process whereby the primes would influence individuals' behavior not in an automatic 
fashion, but via the influence they would have on the appraisal of the situation. 
Our research (together with Herr, 1986; Neuberg, 1988) suggests that biased 
perception processes may indeed sometimes account for what would otherwise appear 
as automatic behavior processes.  That the subliminal priming of morality concepts 
elicited more cooperative behavior among some participants but less cooperative 
behavior among others provides a strong support for this view. The contrastive 
influence of the primes obtained for high consistent pro-selfs could not be accounted for 
by correction-based process.  This correction process is likely to emerge when an 
individual recognizes the potential of primes to bias behavioral responses (Strack, 
Schwarz, Bless, Kubler, & Wanke, 1993). Specifically, individuals who enjoy sufficient 
attentional resources sometimes overcorrect for the mental contamination of the primes 
in restoring the authenticity of their responses (e.g., Comeille, Vescio, & Judd, 2000; 
Martin, Seta, & Crelia, 1990; Moskowitz & Skumik, 1999). 
In the present research, one may however wonder how participants could have 
noticed the contaminating influence of the primes. If  contrastive effects have been 
occasionally reported in studies that relied on the classic scrambled sentences task 
(Comeille et aI., 2000; Moskowitz & Skumik, 1999), they have not been reported in a 
study that relied on a subliminal priming task.  In addition, one may also wonder why 
correction process would have emerged only under the priming of morality concepts 
and only among high consistent pro-self individuals (and only at the behavioral level). 
One possibility is that our morality traits appeared to be more extreme to high consistent 
pro-selfs than to the others individuals (as it has been established that extreme primes 
may sometimes lead to contrastive judgments). However, the recent modelization of 
priming effects proposed by Moskowitz & Skumik (1999) made it clear that only 
extreme exemplars (and not extreme traits) should result in contrastive effects. And, in 
the present study only traits were activated. For all these reasons, we strongly doubt that 
a contrast emerged in the present studies because of a correction for mental 
32 contamination. Rather, there is good reasons to think that the high consistent pro-selfs 
primed with the morality concepts took advantage of a partner's who was appraised as 
particularly cooperative because of  the influence of the prime. 
Finally, we do certainly not mean to argue here that social behavior is alien to 
automatic influences.  Rather, the present research suggests that in some situations 
biased perception may be the best explanation for behavioral effects that would 
otherwise appear automatic.  Recently, Wheeler & Petty (2001) also argued that biased 
perception processes might offer a plausible explanation for some automatic behavior 
effects and that this explanation should be thus be considered and assessed as a 
plausible alternative.  Future research we think should pay close attention to this 
possibility and design experiments to determine conditions in which primes influence 
behavioral choices throughout automatic or mediated processes. 
Conclusion 
The present research demonstrated that transformation processes and 
cooperative behavior in part emerge from people's expectations about the partner. 
These beliefs are influenced by dispositional and situational influences, depending on 
the ambiguity of the situation.  Furthermore, our results indicated that all individuals are 
to some extent sensitive to these partner-based beliefs.  Expectations of partner' 
cooperation determine own cooperative behavior in an assimilative or contrast manner, 
depending on the nature and consistency of one's social value orientation. A remarkable 
finding in our studies is that high consistent pro-selfs were as sensitive as the other 
individuals to their environment and that their expectations regarding the partner's 
cooperation strongly influenced their decision process.  They however decided to 
exploit their partner rather than subscribing to a norm of reciprocity that the other 
participants appeared to share (as indicated by the pattern of correlations between 
expectation and cooperation measures reported in Exp. 2, 3, and 4). 
Our results only hold to first-trial social interactions.  Often social interactions 
comprise more than one confrontation.  In that case, individuals are often provided with 
feedback about their partner's cooperation.  This feedback information may then distort 
the initial beliefs about partner's cooperation and people might use this information to 
determine their own cooperative behavior.  For instance, individuals might use specific 
norms or strategies (e.g., Tit-for-Tat) to deal with partner's cooperation in sequential 
games.  Future research of course should investigate how long initial beliefs, influenced 
by social value orientations and situation-specific features, will last. 
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38 Footnotes 
1 An individualistic transformation reflects no real outcome transformation because 
outcome preference is consistent with the outcomes displayed in the given matrix. 
2 Decomposed game techniques have been developed to measure disposition-based 
differences (the Triple-Dominance Technique of Social Values, e.g., Kuhlman & 
Marshello, 1975; Van Lange, Otten, De Bruin, & Joireman, 1997b; or the Ring Measure 
of Social Values, e.g., Liebrand, 1984; Liebrand & McClintock, 1988).  In both 
techniques, participants have to make choices among various combinations of outcomes 
for the self versus outcomes for an imaginary other person.  These techniques can 
indicate whether participants have a pro-social or pro-self social value orientation. 
3  One could argue that high consistent pro-socials might be  somewhat susceptible to 
morality primes and high consistent pro-selfs might be somewhat susceptible to might 
primes  (according  the  might-vs.-morality  phenomenon,  see  Liebrand  et  aI.,  1986). 
However, because Hertel & Fiedler (1998) did not report any findings on an interaction 
between social value orientation and primes, we just follow their basic finding, which 
suggested that high consistent individuals are not susceptible at all to primes. 
4 In fact, a median split matched the same distribution of participants across high and 
low consistency categories (for all four experiments).  Moreover, different analyses 
using median split and a priori criteria revealed the same pattern of results. 
5 For all four experiments, individualists and competitors were equally distributed 
across low and high consistent pro-selfs. 
'We never used the words cooperation, non-cooperation, pro-social behavior or pro-self 
behavior in the instructions. 
7  We found no effects of different expectation-choice orders in Experiment 2,  3 and 4. 
Therefore, we will not report anymore on this factor. 
,  Correlations  were  calculated  with  the  assumption  that  expectations  of  partner's 
cooperation  influenced  own  cooperative  behavior.  Behavior  may  in  part  influence 
expectations but two arguments are against this.  First, we counterbalanced the order of 
assessing expectations and behavior.  There was no order effect.  Thus, making a choice 
did not influence the formation of expectations.  Second,  and more importantly, high 
consistent  pro-selfs  in  the  morality  priming  conditions  showed  a  high  degree  of 
expected cooperation while they acted in  a non-cooperative manner.  If one assumes 
39 that individuals used their own behavior as  a basis for forming expectations, then one 
should expect that high consistent pro-selfs used their own non-cooperative behavior in 
the morality priming condition to  form non-cooperative  expectations of their partner. 
Instead,  these  individuals  had  strong  cooperative  expectations  of  their  partner's 
cooperation.  Therefore,  we  assume  that,  because  all  individuals'  expectations 
assimilate to the primes,  expectations of partner's cooperation have  a much  stronger 
impact on own cooperative behavior than vice versa. 
40 Table 1 
Correlations Between Expectations of Partner's Cooperation and Own 
Cooperative Behavior as a Function of Social Value Orientation, Consistency and 
Social Value  Consistency 
Orientation 
Pro-social  High 
Pro-self  High 
Pro-social  Low 
Pro-self  Low 
Note:  *  p < .05 
**  p <.01 




Morality  Neutral  Might 
.65**  .92***  .79*** 
-.81 ***  -.16  .93*** 
.70**  .78***  .58* 
.72**  .63*  .80*** 
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Correlations Between Expectations of Partner's Cooperation and Own 













Note:  *  p < .05 
**  p < .01 













.79*** Table 3 
Correlations Between Expectations of Partners' Cooperation and Own 













Note:  *  p < .05 
**  p<.OI 


















.85*** Figure 1 



















•  Morality primes 
I§I Neutral primes 
o  Might primes 
High consistent pro-socials  High consistent pro-setts  Low consistent pro-socials  Low consistent pro-selfs 
44 Figure 2 
Mean Expectations of Partner's Cooperation and Mean Cooperative Behavior as a 
3.5 
3 
Function of Social Value Orientation, Consistency and Primes 
Experiment 2 
Expectations d  partner's coaperatioo 
H!tI <XJ15isIent H!tI arosIsient  lowCXllEislert  lowaroslstert 
~aJs  plt>Sl!ifs  prMCdaJs  pIt>SI!ifs 
45 













H!tIarosIsIS"It H!tIarosIstert  low<XJ15islent  lowaroslstert 
pr!>QldaIs  pIt>SI!ifs  ~aJs  pIt>SI!ifs Figure 3 







'0  2 
















'0  2 








H[f1 amSlat H[f1 cx:rSstert  lDNcx:rSstert  lDNcrrsistert 
J:tI)-&XJas  ~  ~s  iJl)SEJfs 
H[f1amstert H[f1amstat lDNcrrsiSlat lDNamSlat 
J:tI)-&XJas  ~  ~as  ~ 
46 Figure 4 


















Function of Social Value Orientation, Consistency and Primes 
Experiment 4 
Expectations of partners' cooperation  Coopendive behavior 
3.5 
Hgh oonsistent  Hg,  oonsistent  Lcmconsistent  Lcmconsistent  H!j1 cxnsistErt  H[/l""';stert  lmJcxnsistert  lmJc:omistert 
pro-sodals  pro-se/fs  pro-sodals  pro-seifs  P'O"Odais  ~  prc>SOdais  prc><lEifs 
47 